

Anderson Papers
Intel activities
file
1972

Kissinger Approves A Plan For Release Of 11 Indian POWs From 'President'

Following is a transcript of the secret documents turned over to The Washington Post yesterday by a designated colonel Jack Anderson.

SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
Re: 100-158493/12
UNCLASSIFIED AT 12
YEARS INTERVALS
(U)
Not Automatically
Declassified
INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM FOR
RECORD
SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on India/Pakistan

Participants: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State—John N. Irwin
Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard
Director, Central Intelligence Agency—Richard M. Helms
Deputy Administrator (AID)—Maurice J. Williamson
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Admiral Thomas Moorer
Assistant Secretary of State (NEA)—Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of State (IO)—Samuel DePalma
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—Armelind L. Selten
Assistant Administrator (AID/NEA)—Donald G. MacDonalda

Time and Place: 3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.

SUMMARY:
Reviewed conflicting reports about major action in the West Wing, CIA asked to provide map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President's order to the Secretary of Defense to release \$50 million and a hold on further action implementing the \$50 million PA-480 program. Convening of Security Council meeting planned on discussion of India/Pakistan with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of the actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of the actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of the actual situation in West Pakistan.

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soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.S. is not to be in this kind of situation effectively, its ability has come to an end and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire him, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is hating me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal! Kissinger: The earlier draft statement for Bush is too enhanced.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we never political reaction but the real job of the Security Council is to provide a framework for the U.N. action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from K. Sisco or from the U.S. Government. U.N. approach would be tilted toward the Pak Ambassador.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan? Kissinger: Wait until I talk with the President.

WILLIAMS: He has addressed the meeting in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: The act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation under review.

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are not under any obligation of additional irreversible commitment of credit.

KISSINGER: We need to think about the treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo from the Secretary of Defense to the President about the treaty obligations.

PACKARD: I visited Pakistan in January 1962. I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about conditions of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of the actual situation in West Pakistan.

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Downgraded at 5 by a 12 interval after 12 years

3. Summary. It was decided that the U.S. would request an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The U.S. resolution would be introduced in a speech by Ambassador Bush as soon as possible.

4. Mr. DePalma opened the meeting by stating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no holds barred attack on Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on the night of December 17, 1971.

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26. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a brief rundown on the military situation. Admiral Zumwalt responded that he thought the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately one or two weeks before the Soviets to cement their position. The Indians are pushing for permanent use of the naval base at Visag. He anticipated that the Soviets would take the line. He suggested that the Paks should be one of the first to speak out immediately following the presentation by the two contending nations. He felt that the impact of our statement would be clearer if it were made early. Dr. Kissinger vetoed no objections.

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28. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the next meeting will convene Monday morning (Dec. 11).

29. H. N. Kay, N. KAY, South Asia/MAP Branch, Extension 72400

Bangla Desh Plight Noted

SECRET SENSITIVE
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
8 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

Subject: Washington Special Action Committee Report on India-Pakistan Hostilities, 6 December 1971.

1. The NSC Washington Special Action Committee met in the Situation Room, The White House at 1100, Monday, 6 December 1971, to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees: Dr. Henry Kissinger, NSC; Mr. James Noyes, Defense; Mr. Armistead Seiden, NSC; Mr. Samuel Haskinson, NSC; Mr. Donald MacDonald, NSC; Mr. Maurice Williams, NSC; Mr. John Waller, CIA; Mr. Samuel DePalma, NSC; Mr. Bruce Langston, State; Mr. Joseph Sisco, State; Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State.

3. Summary. Discussion was devoted to the massive problems facing Bangladesh as a nation. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the problem should be studied now. The subject of possible military aid to Pakistan is also to be examined, but on a very close hold basis. The matter of Indian reemployment from East to West was considered as was the military of the current sea "blockade" by India.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
Wednesday, Jan. 5, 1972 A 7

Yesterday, Muskie for-
mally joined the race for
the Democratic nomination.
He has the generally ac-
knowledgeed front-runner
status of a man who has
won. Like many successful
politicians, Muskie has a
fatalistic streak in him, at
least he told me. He told
him that nobody can pre-
dict the breaks and what-
ever happens will happen.

"You work hard and you
get some breaks and you try
to make the most of them,"
the senator mused yester-
day. He worked hard on the
campaign trail, he said, and
television and if he goes
over well—he said he hopes
he will—he will be in a
good position to do what he
should like. Whatever hap-
pens, he has nothing to lose
and he has nothing to gain.
He would speak decades in poli-
tics, and he certainly never
would have been elected if he
thought that he'd have a chance to
be President.

He prepared himself
as well as he knows how,
and now is ready for the
chance. He said that if he
I, can really meet the test of
the presidency I don't sup-
pose he would be elected. He
were elected to that office,"
he told Maine newsmen in
the days before he was

didacy for the Democratic presidential nomination soon said, "Vietnam is being escalated and the American people are wondering what happened."

Also touring Florida yesterday was Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who predicted that retention of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew on the Republican ticket this year will "lead many to Democrats in November."

He said many positions taken by Agnew "are statements in overkill and will work adversely on the Nixon administration." He also predicted that voters will not "throw their vote away" by casting ballots for Alabama Gov. George C. Wallace. Wallace has indicated he will enter the Florida primary and observers there believe he would run strong in the northern counties. He insists that Jackson has no plans to carry

sen. George S. McGovern (D-S.D.) formally entered the New Hampshire presidential primary yesterday, promising to "bring the peace to Vietnam" (McDaine) a "very tough fight" in the March 1972 election.

"I'm not under any illusion that it will be easy to pull a McGovern," he said, "but I know where Ed Muskie is right next to McGovern said in Concord, N.H., that he would "cede him this state or any other. I think we're going to win."

McGovern's New Hampshire backers, who have been organizing for the fight since early 1970, have collected about 2,000 signatures to place his name on the ballot.

"I'm going to have to file one on Thursday, Sen. Vance Hartke of Indiana filed yesterday and Los Angeles' Mayor Tom Bradley today," McGovern said.

Complete. That will complete the four-man field vying for 18 Democratic convention delegates and the psychological momentum that will carry the first primary.


Pulls taken in New Hampshire yesterday gave McGovern between 3-to-1 to 5-to-1 margins over McGovern, with McGovern's supporters favoring other candidates or undecided. No polls on the McGovern issue have surfaced elsewhere.

Meanwhile, Endicott Peabody, McGovern's New Hampshire spokesman who announced last week he will run for vice president, said McGovern supporters yesterday in the New Hampshire Democratic primary "are not looking for a vice president," he said, "because it is time that the people elect a president who is elected to the second most important public office in the country."

Rep. Paul McCloskey (R-Cal.) charged that President Nixon is pursuing the bombing of North Vietnam, "which has caused the Vietnamese government from falling into after the 1972 election."

He told a high school audience, "President Nixon insists that the only way to achieve the unification of Vietnam." In Columbus, Ohio, Sen. Frank Lausche (D-Ohio) announced that he is withdrawing as a favorite-son candidate for the 1972 election and has unflinchingly pledged to President Nixon will be chosen to run in 1972.

In Miami, Rep. Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.) began a campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives of Miami students that "domestic war will break out if the United States and Vietnam conflict is so on a strong basis. Mrs. Chisholm, who is a member of the Democratic Party, said that the Democratic Party is the only party that has the courage to stand up to the Vietnam war. She said that the Democratic Party is the only party that has the courage to stand up to the Vietnam war. She said that the Democratic Party is the only party that has the courage to stand up to the Vietnam war.



Vogue Pattern 8202

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Secret U.S. Papers Bared

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a major challenge to the secrecy surrounding U.S. policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night gave The Washington Post the full texts of three secret documents describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG).

The documents indicate that Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, instructed government agencies to take a hard line with India in public statements and private actions during last month's war on the Indian subcontinent.

Anderson released the documents after Kissinger told reporters Monday during an airborne conversation en route to the Western White House in San Clemente that the columnist, in stories based on the materials, had taken "out of context" remarks indicating that the administration was against India.

Among the significant statements bearing

on U.S. policy in the documents were the following:

- "KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise."

- "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind."

- "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at 'too high a level.'"

- "Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi

Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan."

- "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extinguishing' West Pakistan."

- "Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them."

Dr. Kissinger said that the President made

See DOCUMENTS, A9, Col. 1

Texts of documents. Page A8

DOCUMENTS From A1

want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated."

After getting the documents from Anderson, The Post decided to print the full texts in today's editions.

Anderson said he would make the documents available to other members of the press today, and he invited Sen. J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to use them as the basis for an investigation of U.S. policy in South Asia.

Fulbright, out of Washington during the congressional recess, could not be reached for comment.

The columnist also suggested that other members of Congress might wish to investigate government security classification policy.

Most of the significant statements in the three documents released last night had already appeared in Anderson's column, which is distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post.

The Justice Department acknowledged yesterday that the FBI is investigating the nature of the security leak that led to the disclosures.

But Anderson, who said he will write several more columns based on the documents, pointed out that no government agent had visited him and that he had received no request to halt publication. The Post has not received any such request either.

Pentagon sources said another investigation is underway by military security agents. They said the scope of their investigation would be narrow because "very few people" have access to minutes of the meetings.

Anderson, in an interview with The Post, said he also had copies of cables to Washington from the U.S. ambassadors to India and Pakistan, as well as numerous other documents bearing on American policy.

He showed this reporter a briefcase with about 20 file folders, each containing some of the documents.

Anderson declined to name his sources, but suggested that they occupy high positions in the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified," he said "it would embarrass the administration more than it would me. It



HENRY A. KISSINGER
... coolness to India



JACK ANDERSON
... releases documents

would make a very funny story."

Since the controversy last year over release of the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret history of U.S. policy in Vietnam, Anderson said, his sources had become more, rather than less, willing to disclose classified material.

The texts obtained by The Post provide substantial details of the back-and-forth at Special Action Group meetings among representatives of the White House, State and Defense departments, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Agency for International Development.

The three texts are:

- A "memorandum for record" about a WSAG meeting in the Situation Room of the White House on Dec. 3, by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian affairs. It was approved by G. Warren Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, and was printed on his stationery.

- A memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on their stationery, concerning a meeting on Dec. 4, by Navy Capt. Howard N. Kay, a JCS staffer.

- Another memorandum by Kay on JCS stationery about a meeting on Dec. 6.

The first of the three meetings was held on the opening day of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan. That was the day Pakistani aircraft launched a series of strikes against Indian airfields on the western border. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi immediately proclaimed her country's "no war footing."

By the time of the second meeting, the war had spread through East and West Pakistan; by the third meeting, Mrs. Gandhi had announced India's recognition of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, as a sovereign country.

The Post obtained typewritten copies of photocopies of the documents in Anderson's possession.

Anderson's copies, which were inspected by a representative of The Post, showed that the original documents were stamped "SECRET SENSITIVE" at the top and bottom of each page.

Anderson said he hoped his columns on the Indo-Pakistani situation, and now the release of the documents, would provoke a "showdown" on the government classification system.

He said he had been "timid" originally about quoting from the documents, but later quoted more extensively when he became convinced of the "colossal blunders" of U.S. policy.

Invoking his own view of what might harm national security, he said he would not release the exact texts of cables, "just in case they would be useful to cryptographers."

Anderson said the documents should not have been classified in the first place. He said they showed that "Kissinger is surrounded by secrecy. He is treated like a new weapons system."

The Anderson documents differ from the Pentagon Papers in that his disclosures cover current diplomatic activities, rather than history.

None of the newspapers that ever had possession of the four documents as the most sensitive. Those volumes dealt with U.S. diplomatic contacts through other nations for a negotiated settlement of the Vietnam war.

After government suits against The New York Times, The Washington Post and other newspaper had worked their way through the federal courts, the Supreme Court declared on June 30 that the government had not proved its contention that publication would endanger national security.

In releasing the documents last night, Anderson said "I don't think the public should have to take either my word or Dr. Kissinger's" about whether his columns had quoted the documents "out of context."

"I invite reporters to compare Dr. Kissinger's statements at the secret strategy sessions with the transcript of Dr. Kissinger's background briefing to reporters on Dec. 7."

That "background" talk became public when Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) placed it in the Congressional Record, to the surprise of the White House.

In the meeting with news- men on Dec. 7, Kissinger said, "First of all, let us get a number of things straight. There have been some comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate..."

Kissinger said, however, the United States, "which in many respects has had a love affair with India, can only with enormous pain accept the fact that military action was taken in our view without adequate cause..."

State Department officials denied yesterday that any investigation of the leak was underway there. Other sources at State said no one there had been required to undergo lie detector tests, as in some previous security investigations.

Anderson said, however, that his sources told him investigations were being conducted at State, Defense and the White House, reportedly under the coordination of Robert C. Mardian, assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division.

A Justice Department spokesman said last night, however, that "assistant attorney generals don't coordinate investigations." If any prosecution were initiated, he added, that might fall into "Mardian's bailiwick."

"If Mardian's investigating me," said Anderson, who took over the "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column from the late Drew Pearson, "I'm going to investigate him."

"I have an idea I'll know more about him than he'll know about me," Anderson added. "He can take his to a grand jury, and I'll take mine to the public."

DATE 4 Jan 72

PAGE 20

The Anderson Papers

By TOM WICKER

IN THE NATION

The remarkable series of documentary excerpts now being published by the columnist Jack Anderson is a public service of the first order. Since the authenticity of these documents has not been denied by an obviously discomfited White House, they provide a valuable glimpse into the making of policy—in this case, a policy that to many Americans seems disastrous.

More than that, the Anderson papers suggest the extent to which the Government can, and does, mislead the public in the pursuit of what the President and his advisers may decide is the national interest. They show again the abundant use of security classification to keep the public in ignorance. And they demonstrate that publication is one of the few remaining checks on the foreign policy powers of the imperial Presidency.

The papers make one thing perfectly clear—that President Nixon, with the aid of Dr. Henry Kissinger, set out deliberately to put the United States into a position of support for Pakistan at whatever cost. "We are not trying to be even-handed," said Dr. Kissinger to high Administration officials.

That might have been a proper course for a nation opposing, say, Hitler's expansionism. In the complex situation on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan's obvious weakness—if nothing else—made self-defeating a policy of all-out opposition to India. That the brutal excesses of Pakistani repression of the Bengalis was overlooked, to the point where all aid to India was to be suspended while clandestine means of arming the Paks were sought, is simply repugnant to the American conscience—or ought to be.

Besides, nobody in Washington bothered to make clear to the public that Washington was not being "even-handed." Thus its condemnation of India sounded more like a considered, fair analysis than a deliberate, purposeful policy; and that is the kind of swampy ground in which credibility gaps are dug.

That is even more true of the instance documented by Mr. Anderson in which Dr. Kissinger and others sought to transfer to Pakistan arms already delivered to Jordan—while maintaining the public posture that arms were not being supplied to either participant in the war! That is entirely worthy of the men who brought you "re-enforced protective reaction."

So was the public pretense that an American carrier task force in the Bay of Bengal was there to evacuate threatened in the Anderson papers) that its

actual mission was to divert Indian ships and planes and thus to weaken the Indian drive against East Pakistan.

Nor do the various stories now being advanced to explain these and other Administration actions seem to hold much water. If, for instance, the task force actually was there to stop India from overrunning West Pakistan, too, as Administration leaks now suggest, nothing in India's actual behavior toward West Pakistan seems to have warranted such action; nor is it likely that one carrier task force could have been so effective a deterrent; and, in any case, the American people still were being misled about the deployment of their forces.

And if, as other articles have suggested, Mr. Nixon's intent really was to solidify an American alignment with China, also a supporter of Pakistan, against the Soviet Union, the curious results are that Soviet power on the subcontinent is vastly extended, as a result, and American influence in India is at lowest ebb. If we now are closer to China than we were, what suggestion was there in their acrimonious history that Peking and Moscow were likely to be soon reconciled? In order to gain face in China, did we really need to lose our shirts in India?

Thus, behind the facade of secrecy and security which shields so much of the Government's purposes and activities in the world, a policy that was dubious at best was shaped to Mr. Nixon's personal dictates, and presented to the public as something other than what it was. But the valuable documents Mr. Anderson has been publishing must have been supplied to him by someone with access to them who believed either that that manner of making policy, or the policy itself, or both, ought to be exposed to the American people.

How else could that be done, except by publication? And if it is to be maintained, as the Nixon Administration did in the Pentagon Papers case, that stamping "Top Secret" on the Government's memos and minutes makes them immune to publication and superior to the First Amendment, then security classification becomes an all-encompassing means of concealing whatever the Government wants to conceal.

It took years for someone to challenge that arrogant privilege, in the case of the Vietnam war; but it has happened much more quickly in the India-Pakistan case. Maybe the Government is now finding its own official ineptitude be shrouded in "security."

Columnist Says Nixon Pressed Policy Against India

By TERENCE SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3—President Nixon was "furious" with his subordinates during the recent India-Pakistan war for not taking a stronger stand against India, the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported today.

Mr. Anderson quoted Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, as having told a meeting of senior Administration officials: "I'm getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

According to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Kissinger directed that all United States officials "show a certain coolness" to the Indians. "The Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level," he is quoted as having said.

The quotations in Mr. Anderson's column today were the latest in a series of verbatim reports of secret White House strategy sessions dealing with the crisis that the columnist has published during the last several days.

His column is syndicated to 700 newspapers, 100 of them overseas. Mr. Anderson took

over the column on the death of his colleague Drew Pearson in September, 1969.

The publication of the reports, which Mr. Anderson says are classified "secret sensitive," has infuriated the White House and unsettled national security officials.

Government sources confirmed today that an investigation had been started by the White House to determine who leaked the classified documents.

The sources said the new investigation, reportedly being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is directed at individuals in the State and Defense Departments and on the National Security Council staff who have had access to the notes quoted by Mr. Anderson.

The quotations published by the columnist are not official minutes of the meetings, but rather notes prepared by representatives of the various departments attending.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Anderson said he had been given two complete sets of notes of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, a high-level strategy committee assembled during crises that dealt with the India-Pakistan conflict. The meetings were held in early December.

Notes by Pentagon Aides

The notes he has published so far, the columnist said, are from those taken for the Defense Department and are signed by two Pentagon officials.

Mr. Anderson said he had received scores of other classified documents, including secret intelligence reports and cablegrams, that he intended to publish during the next two weeks.

"I am trying to force a show-

down with the Administration over their classification system," the columnist said. "Everything Kissinger does—even the toilet paper he uses—is being stamped 'secret.' That's not in the public interest in a democracy."

Mr. Anderson said neither he nor members of his staff had yet been questioned by Government investigators, but that he had "positive" information that the F.B.I. had already interrogated individuals at the White House and State and Defense departments in an effort to discover who had provided him with the documents.

Aide Declines Comment

Gerald L. Warren, the acting Press Secretary at the White House, declined today to say whether an investigation had been ordered. He also declined all comment on the Anderson columns.

In the column published today, Mr. Anderson quotes from notes taken during the Washington Special Action Group's meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 8.

In the first session, he quotes Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, as saying the Indians were "currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack on East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion," the column continues, "this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is quoted as having said, "On AID matters the President wants to proceed against India only." He was referring to the Agency for International Development.

This instruction was amplified on Dec. 8, when, according to the column, "Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

On Dec. 4, the Administration suspended its aid program in India.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 4, 1972 B11

Arabs Disagree on War Renewal

By Jack Anderson

Arab leaders disagree in private, whether to renew hostilities against Israel.

Their most secret conversations picked up by the Central Intelligence Agency reveal that Syria's President Hafez al-Assad holds Egypt's President Anwar Sadat in contempt for threatening an offensive he isn't likely to start.

Even if Egypt should attack Israel, Assad has told associates, "I would not expect too much from the Egyptians." He added fiercely that the Egyptians "will never again pull us into a war and leave us in the lurch."

Next time, he said, the Syrians will be ready. "When the blow comes," he said, "whether Egypt or Israel starts it first, we will seize the opportunity and fight."

The secret intelligence report, telling of Assad's conversation, emphasized that he used the Arabic word "lamma" which means "when," not "if."

His army chief, Gen. Mustafa Talas, is also quoted in the secret cable as telling his military colleagues tersely: "There is no other choice. We must fight and we will fight."

He acknowledged that "all the Arabs combined are weaker than Israel." But he vowed the Syrians, at least, would fight anyway "if not to gain a victory, at least to keep the war case hot between us and Israel."

As he put it: "If the Arabs had continued to fight Israel after their successive defeats in 1948, 1956 and 1967, rather than turning their backs in defeat, many world leaders would have changed their policies" toward the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Military Moves

Significantly, Syrian troops and armor have been spotted moving "through Damascus heading south," and the Syrians are reported to be "seriously preparing for new hostilities with Israel."

The Egyptians, meanwhile, have been shouting the loudest about resuming the war. But in private, Gen. Mahmud Tuhami, the Egyptian-army's operations chief has told intimates that "any major attempt at crossing the Suez Canal is bound to fail."

Declares a secret cable: "Tuhami said that President Anwar Sadat, when threatening Israel with an all-out war, was bluffing and... informed the army of this."

Tuhami suggested that the army might "carry out small-scale commando attacks" but that these raids "would be carefully controlled so as not to cause over-reaction from the Israelis."

The Egyptian high command, he said, was "very concerned that Israel would take advantage of Sadat's threats to carry out a preemptive strike which would destroy

the Egyptian army and air force."

The U.S. has renewed its efforts, meanwhile to settle the Arab-Israeli dispute at the truce table rather than the battlefield. American diplomats have spread the word, according to a secret report, that "we could not be complacent about future Egyptian military moves if no political progress is achieved."

Footnote: The Syrians belittle the Egyptians in private but fight with the Jordanians in the open. Yet an intelligence cable quotes President Assad as commenting wryly "that perhaps the Syrian army would find itself alongside the Jordan Arab army as the only two armies which would fight Israel fiercely."

Washington Whirl

Utterior Welcome—Those Welcome Wagons, laden with bounties for new arrivals in neighborhoods across the nation, are under investigation. The Federal Trade Commission has evidence the smiling hostesses, in some cases, have been doubling as private eyes for the business firms whose free gifts they pass out. Some hostesses allegedly have been reporting back the age and make of cars, the condition of carpeting and the financial affairs of the families they visit. Chairman Miles Kirkpatrick has written Rep. Ogden Reid (R-N.Y.) that the FTC is looking "into the various practices of Welcome Wagon, Inc." The company has denied that occa-

sional snooping by its cheery young ladies is company policy.

Top Secret Jokes—When the National Security Agency is not clacking out classified messages in code over its closely-guarded teletype machines, the electronic farf tends to get a little gamy. During a recent slack period, dignified security officials were astounded to see their teletypes rattling out more than 200 words of the vulgar old joke that begins, "Once upon a time there lived a man who had a mad passion for beans..." The officials discovered that clerks had been telling each other dirty jokes on the secret circuit when it was not being used for transmitting cryptographic intelligence reports.

Strange Economics—The purpose of President Nixon's economic program is to keep costs down. Yet the General Accounting Office recently use the new economic regulations to keep prices up. The National Graphics Corp. of Columbus, Ohio, was low bidder on some government binding and printing contracts. But the company, because of an oversight, had failed to sign a pledge certifying it was in line with the President's economic orders. Its low bid should have spoken for itself. But instead of giving National Graphics a chance to correct its oversight the GAO gave the contract to the second low bidder at a loss to the taxpayers of \$4,500.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 3, 1972

B9

Secret Minutes Dispute Kissinger

By Jack Anderson

We can now document from secret White House minutes our charge that presidential braintruster Henry Kissinger lied to reporters when he told them the Nixon administration wasn't anti-India.

Contrary to Kissinger's statement to the press, the minutes show that President Nixon not only ordered a pro-Pakistan policy but became furious with his subordinates for not taking a stronger stand against India.

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India," complained Kissinger at the Dec. 3 strategy session.

Three days later, according to the minutes, Kissinger "directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians. The Indian ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

The India-Pakistani conflict was reviewed almost daily by a crisis team known as the Washington Special Action Group. Here's a typical ex-

cerpt from the secret minutes for Dec. 4:

"Mr. Helms (the CIA director) opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides... Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war, President Yahya has stated that 'the final war with India is upon us'..."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

"Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action..."

"Dr. Kissinger requested that by Monday the CIA prepare an account of who did what to whom and when."

"Mr. DePalma (Assistant State Secretary) suggested that if we refer to the Indian declaration in our discussion in the UN, that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya."

"Dr. Kissinger replied that

he was under specific instructions from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House."

Kissinger's Semantics

"Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all-out war."

"Mr. Helms said that the terminology was 'no holds barred.'"

"Dr. Kissinger asked what the Paks have said. Mr. Helms said the terminology was final war with India. Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an objectionable term. It did not seem outrageous for the Paks to say they were trying to defend themselves..."

Later in the meeting, Kissinger instructed: "On AID matters, the President wants to proceed against India only."

The secret minutes of the December 8 meeting shed more light on this:

"Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, (surplus) commodities or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House."

"Mr. Williams (Deputy AID Director) stated there was no problem of anything sliding through."

"Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be."

"Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a position concerning AID material currently under contract. This, however, would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevokable letters of credit..."

"Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget for India only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

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Jack Anderson

Peace Prospects In Indochina War

THERE IS a glimmer of hope that the outbreak of fighting in Indochina may be followed by serious negotiations for peace.

Intelligence reports claim that Communist cadres have been alerted to expect a prolonged ceasefire and peace negotiations.

The military step-up in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam just possibly could be a Communist maneuver to improve their bargaining position.

But the intelligence experts are skeptical. Cautions a secret Intelligence Information Cable:

"It seems doubtful that (Hanoi) is actually considering the declaration of such a ceasefire. (Hanoi) may, however, be considering a 'de facto' ceasefire and be using the argument... to make the current VC situation more palatable to the lower level cadres and to rebuild their morale."

The ground fighting in all three countries, meanwhile, has been intensified. Intelligence reports contain guarded hints that the Vietcong may attempt another limited Tet offensive in South Vietnam at the end of the month.

But the most serious military threat is aimed at Laos. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, in desperation, called for American bombers, including giant B-52s, to slow the enemy advance.

The request was forwarded by McMurtrie Godley, the American ambassador, to the Pentagon. Adm. Thomas Moorer, the Joint Chiefs chairman, approved a B-52 strike and submitted his recommendation in a top-secret memo to Defense Secretary Laird.

"Ambassador Godley has requested a B-52 strike..." wrote Moorer. "The proposed target area has been identified as a major logistical complex which will be used

to support the new enemy units now moving west... All source intelligence has revealed a significant increase in enemy activity in the target area..."

The raid, identified by the code name "Arc Light," was okayed. The returning B-52 crews reported that their bombs caused "six secondary explosions."

Fighter-bombers also began hitting targets in Laos. But the North Vietnamese unexpectedly struck back with anti-aircraft missiles and Mig-21 fighter planes.

The United States, in return, retaliated by sending

waves of bombers over North Vietnam. (We had reported a year ago that the Pentagon was keeping its contingency plans updated for bombing the North.)

It is evident that fighting escalates much easier than negotiating.

Flood Warning

EARLY ONE Saturday morning last August the people of Bound Brook, N.J., awoke and saw the sunshine. The heavy rains from hurricane Doria had apparently passed; a crisis had been avoided.

Hours later the waters were six feet high along Main Street in Bound Brook. Scores of businesses and homes, including Mayor Sam Patullo's dry cleaning store, were wiped out. Rising rapidly and without warning, flood waters from the Greenbrook River cost the small town \$17 million in damages. Luckily no lives were lost.

The scene in Bound Brook is not unusual. Each year floods strike hundreds of unprepared communities, driving 75,000 Americans from their homes and causing \$1 billion worth of property damage.

But, for Bound Brook at least, the next time the floods come the citizens can expect to be prepared. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) plans to install a simple inexpensive device upstream that will alert local officials that the Greenbrook River is rising.

The fail-safe flood alert system, which costs only about \$2,500, operates like a bulb in a toilet tank. The rapidly rising currents trigger a small sensor which is connected to a telephone line. Once the sensor is triggered, sirens will go off almost instantaneously in the police station in nearby Plainfield.

Originally, NOAA planned to place 100 of these new small units in flood-prone areas around the country, but budget cutbacks have forced the government to place units in only a dozen areas along the Eastern Seaboard.

Footnote: J-Tec Associates, a small Cedar Rapids, Iowa, firm specializing in environmental instruments, helped develop and build the new flood-control devices. On J-Tec's board is engineer Ed Nixon, the President's shy, introspective younger brother, who has a keen interest in oceanography and environmental science.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Saturday, Jan. 1, 1972

B 7

U.S., U.N. Damaged by Indian Blitz

By Jack Anderson

Pakistan wasn't the only loser of the bloody, two-week war over Bangladesh. The Indian blitz also badly damaged two bigger victims.

We have already shown from the secret White House Papers that the United States suffered a strategic defeat. Thanks to President Nixon's bungling, Russia has emerged as India's partner, and the United States is out in the cold on the Indian subcontinent.

The other big loser is the United Nations, which failed dismally to keep the peace between India and Pakistan. The U.N.'s impotence, as it groped for an international consensus to end the struggle, caused President Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, to blurt at a secret White House meeting:

"If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end, and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East."

America's U.N. Ambassador, George Bush, suggested in one secret report that Secretary General U Thant's ineffectiveness might be attributed to "physical strain due to his recent illness." But Kissinger put the matter more bluntly by calling the U.N. wrangle a "farce."

Kissinger made clear his contempt for the U.N. at a

White House strategy session on Dec. 4.

"We will have difficulty in the U.N.," suggested Samuel DePalma, the State Department's specialist in international organizations, "because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do."

"We have told the Paks we would make our statement," replied Kissinger. "Let's go ahead and put in our own statement anyway regardless of what other countries want to do. We need now to make our stand clear even though it has taken us two weeks of fiddling."

Kissinger's Comments

The secret minutes continue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N. itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war."

At this point, Kissinger declared: "Nothing will happen at the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce."

"The Soviet tactic will be to stall, as they do not want a cease-fire yet," agreed Christopher Van Hollen, another State Department expert.

DePalma said the Indians "could shilly-shally for three or four days"—long enough,

chimed in CIA director Richard Helms, "for them to occupy East Pakistan."

Footnote: When Indian troops threatened Dacca, Secretary General U Thant's first reaction was to evacuate the U.N. mission.

This brought stern, secret instructions from State Secretary Bill Rogers to Ambassador Bush: "Request U.S.U.N. (U.S. delegation) to convey to SYG (Secretary General) or appropriate senior official our deep concern regarding decision of SYG to withdraw all U.N. officials from East Pakistan as demanded by Indian government."

"In earlier message from Dacca, U.N. group in East Pakistan was cited as having been instructed by U.N.N.Y. (U.N. headquarters) to defer evacuation of U.N. officials so they may be in place for possible assistance in arranging cease-fire . . .

"Suggest in course of discussion you stress critical role which U.N. can play in protecting human rights and seeking peace during current crisis."

Washington Whirl

Reverse Justice—We reported earlier that the Justice Department was trying to reduce a U.S. Court of Claims commissioner's damage recommendation to a Miami Herald photographer named Doug Kennedy who was wounded by American Marines in the Dominican Republic six years

ago. The court recommended Kennedy receive \$100,000. Subsequently, however, he was stricken with cancer. So the Justice Department promptly sought to cut down his award on the ground that cancer had reduced his life expectancy. Now Kennedy has died and his wife and child need the award more than ever.

PX Blues—Three separate surveys taken by the Pentagon, a civilian research firm and the Army itself have turned up widespread dissatisfaction with the multibillion-dollar commissary system. The Pentagon study found "customers rated commissary service unsatisfactory." The civilian survey showed 76.9 per cent of commissary customers wanted a better selection. The Army discovered that, out of eight aspects of military life, the commissaries and post exchanges ranked seventh. Meanwhile, despite revelations of waste and corruption in the system, the generals in charge continue to assure Defense Secretary Mel Laird that all is well.

Dole's Dunning—Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.), the brassy Republican National Chairman, has sent out letters soliciting \$50 and \$75 contributions for the Senate campaign of his old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (R-Mich.). But the letters were sent to non-Michigan money men, thus angering other GOP candidates who see the dunning as poaching on their homestate preserves.

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1 JAN 1972

Probe Is On To Find Leak To Anderson

Associated Press

U.S. officials said yesterday a security investigation is under way to find out who "leaked" to a columnist inside information about White House strategy sessions early this month concerning the India-Pakistan conflict.

The officials, who declined to be identified by name, voiced concern about the publication of the material by columnist Jack Anderson.

Anderson columns have been quoting from what Anderson says are classified reports. They deal in part with suggestions by some administration officials that some countries such as Jordan be allowed to transfer U.S.-furnished arms to Pakistan.

The administration did not engage in such transfers, and maintained its embargo on weapons deliveries to Pakistan.

Some of Anderson's material is said to come from meetings of the special action group that deliberated U.S. India-Pakistan policy at the White House during the first days of December.

The group is led by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, head of the White House National Security Council staff, and includes senior representatives from concerned agencies such as the State Department, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

WASHINGTON POST
31 DEC 1971

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

U.S. Show of Force in Bay of Bengal

By Jack Anderson

Throughout the Indian-Pakistan War, the American people once again were misled by their leaders.

Secret documents dispute, for example, the White House explanation for dispatching a naval task force to the Bay of Bengal.

Official spokesmen emphasized that the task force's main mission was to evacuate American citizens from embattled Dacca.

We have studied the secret White House papers dealing with the two-week war. These make clear that the task force—including the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the most powerful ship in the Navy—was sent into Indian waters as a "show of force."

This provocative naval deployment was intended (1) to compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force; (2) to weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan; (3) possibly to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its military mission, and (4) to force India to keep planes on defense alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground troops.

The evacuation of American citizens was strictly a secondary mission, adopted more as the justification than the reason for the naval move.

Here's how the "Top Secret" orders to the task force were

finally worded: "Situation: U.S. citizens may have to be evacuated from the area affected by the present India-Pakistan conflict. The situation may also arise which will require the presence and utilization of a CVA (carrier) to ensure the protection of U.S. interests in the area . . .

"Mission: To form a contingency evacuation force capable of helo (helicopter) evacuation of civilians, of self protection, and of conducting naval air and surface ops (operations) as directed by higher authority in order to support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area."

Secret Excerpts

Meanwhile, those anonymous aides, who whisper the latest word from the White House into the ears of newsmen, have stopped pretending that the task force was intended to evacuate stranded Americans.

Now the aides are leaking the story that President Nixon had learned of the Soviet-Indian plans not only to lop off East Pakistan but to dismember West Pakistan. The task force was ordered into the Indian Ocean, according to this line as a deterrent.

But this, too, is a distortion of the information contained in the White House papers. Here are excerpts from the "Secret Sensitive" strategy session that took place in the

White House's fabled Situation Room shortly before the decision to present a "show of force" in the Bay of Bengal:

"Mr. Helms (the CIA chief) opened the meeting by briefing the current situation . . . It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities . . .

"Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan (the Air Force chief) indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem to be content with a holding action . . .

"Dr. Kissinger (the President's chief foreign policy-maker) suggested that . . . if the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces, we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless.

Scare Tactics

"It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U.S. ally to go down completely? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off? . . .

"Mr. Sisco (assistant State secretary in charge of Asian affairs) stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated, then, of course, there was a serious

risk to West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective . . .

"Dr. Kissinger stated that what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country (India), equipped and supported by the Soviets, may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal . . . One could make a case, he argued, that we have done everything two weeks too late in the current situation . . .

"Mr. Packard (deputy Defense secretary) stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expectation that the West Paks could hold their own . . .

"Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even handed. The President does not want to be even handed. The President believes that India is the attacker . . .

"Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. 'The lady' is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President."

Next day, preparations were made to send a task force into the Bay of Bengal to confront both Soviet and Indian warships.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

Jungle War Blunders Are Cited

By Jack Anderson

Publication of the secret Pentagon Papers exposed, all too late, the miscalculations and misrepresentations that entangled the U.S. in a jungle war in faraway Vietnam.

Without waiting for history to overtake the Indian-Pakistani war, therefore, we have decided to publish highlights from the secret White House Papers dealing with the crisis.

These papers bear a variety of stamps—"Secret Sensitive," "Eyes Only," "Specat (special category) Exclusive," "Noform" (no foreign dissemination) and other classifications even more exotic.

Yet astonishingly, the documents contain almost no information that could possibly jeopardize the national security. On the contrary, the security labels are used to hide the activities—and often the blunders—of our leaders.

We believe the public is entitled to know about these blunders.

Here are our conclusions from studying the White House Papers:

Blunders Cited

• President Nixon, apparently because he liked Pakistan's strongman Yahya Khan and disliked India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, placed the U.S. on the side of a minor military dictatorship against the world's largest democracy. Thereby, he aligned

the U.S. against the Bengalis, whose freedom Yahya had brutally repressed. He overturned their free election, jailed their elected leader and sent troops to terrorize the populace.

• The President gruffly overrode the advice of the State Department's professionals who urged him to use his special influence with Yahya to stop the Pakistani persecution and to grant the Bengalis a measure of autonomy. When the Indian Army finally came to the aid of the Bengalis, the pros pleaded with Mr. Nixon to remain neutral if for no other reason than Pakistan looked like a sure loser. Instead, he supported the repressor and associated the U.S. with Pakistan's eventual humiliation.

• In a fit of petulance, the President sent a naval task force to the Bay of Bengal and risked a military confrontation with Soviet warships.

• As a reward, the Russians are expected to seek military bases on the subcontinent. "The Soviet military ambition in this exercise is to obtain permanent usage of the port of Visakhapatnam," suggested Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy chief, at a secret strategy session. An intelligence report also declares that Bangladesh, the new Bengali state, has "already offered military bases in Chittagong to the Soviet Union in exchange for economic aid."

• At the height of the two-

week war, the White House scrambled around for some way to rush arms shipments to Pakistan. This would have been a violation of our own 1965 arms embargo against both India and Pakistan.

Secret Minutes

Here are excerpts from the "Secret Sensitive" minutes of Kissinger's White House strategy sessions:

"Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan," declare the Dec. 6 minutes. "Mr. Van Hollen (Asian expert, State Department) stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient."

"Mr. Sisco (Assistant State Secretary in charge of Asian affairs) went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat, we will be getting emergency requests from them. Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests..."

"Mr. Packard (Deputy Defense Secretary) then said we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed but said it should be done very quietly."

The Dec. 8 minutes pick up the subject again: "Dr. Kissinger referred to an expression of interest by King Hus-

sein relative to the provision of F-104s to Pakistan..."

"Ambassador Johnson (Ambassador-at-large) said that we must examine the possible effects that additional supplies for Pakistan might have. It could be that eight F-104s might not make any difference once the real war in (West Pakistan) starts. They could be considered only a token..."

"Mr. Packard stated that the overriding consideration is the practical problem of either doing something effective or doing nothing. If you don't win, don't get involved..."

The following day, a secret message was flashed to Ambassador to Jordan L. Dean Brown: "You should tell King Hussein we fully appreciate heavy pressure he feels himself under by virtue of request from Pakistan. We are nevertheless not yet in a position to give him definite response. Whole subject remains under intensive review at very high level of USG."

In New Delhi, Ambassador to India Kenneth Keating received a copy of the secret orders to Brown. Keating sent an anguished message to Washington, pleading: "Any action other than rejection (of the plan to ship planes to Pakistan by way of Jordan) would pose enormous further difficulties in Indo-U.S. relations."

We will print additional excerpts from the White House Papers in future columns.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Dec. 28, 1971

B7

Allies in Cambodia Said Incompetent

By Jack Anderson

The Vietnam story, like a rerun of a bad movie, is repeating itself across the border in Cambodia.

Cambodian strongman Lon Nol has plunged his government into disarray. His top aides have sought, in vain, to persuade him to step down. Now they are talking ominously of a coup.

The military effort to stop a Communist takeover is floundering. Communist forces have now surrounded Cambodia's capital, Pnom Penh, on three sides.

The U.S., typically, is trying to solve the crisis by rushing more supplies to bail out Lon Nol. Because of congressional opposition, some supplies are being sneaked through the back door by way of Indonesia. The U.S. is also bringing pressure upon other allies to come to Lon Nol's aid.

A secret intelligence report, meanwhile, describes him as "a sick man, both physically and mentally . . . His memory is faulty, and he tends to make snap judgments without reference to anything anyone has told him."

No less than American Ambassador Emory Swank, in a report intended for official U.S. eyes only, has criticized "Lon Nol's haphazard, out-of-channel and ill-coordinated

conduct of military operations."

Swank blames recent Cambodian military reverses, costing "substantial losses of men and equipment," upon "ineffective leadership and tactics."

Another intelligence report describes most Cambodian general officers as "simply incompetent." It states that only one top general, besides Lon Nol, "has the ability and force of personality to exercise leadership" at the Chief of Staff level.

Cambodian Corruption

He is identified as Brig. Gen. Srey Saman, now Cambodia's defense attache in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital. But the report adds sadly that "Srey Saman's personal authority is diluted by a tendency toward financial corruption."

Two other top officers, Brig. Gen. Sosthene Fernandez and Brig. Gen. Mao Sum Khem, are also called "technically competent." But the report charges, "both have personal weaknesses which prevent them from exercising effective control over unit commanders."

"Sosthene Fernandez is an inveterate gambler, while Mao Sum Khem is a compulsive womanizer. Neither activity is in itself disqualifying, but in these two cases, so much time is consumed and so much corrupt activity is required to finance the activity that they

have lost an essential measure of the respect required to exert real leadership."

The personnel chief, Brig. Gen. Peolim Var, is accused by the report of sending inspection teams, which "are bought off by commanders of the units whose payrolls they are supposed to verify."

These sound distressingly like the secret reports of encephalitis and corruption that U.S. South Vietnamese incompetent officials have tried to keep from the public.

The Communist drive on Pnom Penh, according to U.S. estimates, was intended as a psychological rather than a military operation. Apparently, the Communists never expected any real military success but intended to withdraw to their former position after harassing the city.

Cambodian bungling, however, has turned a hit-and-run psychological attack into a real military threat.

Secret Assessment

Declares one secret military assessment: "Enemy forces have continued to maintain pressure on Pnom Penh. Their presence in strength has generated concern; yet government forces to date have been unable to react effectively."

"The enemy's efforts appear directed at psychologically eroding the morale of the populace while gradually weakening and demoralizing (Cambodian) units around Pnom Penh."

(Cambodian) failure to take aggressive action has allowed (the enemy) to attempt to keep up the momentum both in the capital area and elsewhere in the country . . .

These dispatches read like the secret reports that came out of South Vietnam during the 1960s.

Footnote: Lon Nol's top ministers called on him at his residence on Dec. 7 and suggested that he relinquish some of his authority. "Lon Nol rejected these proposals out of hand," reports Ambassador Swank.

Rueful Bhutto

Pakistan's new President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban ended up side by side at the United Nations dinner honoring outgoing Secretary General U Thant the other night.

The UN had passed over, overwhelmingly the ceasefire resolution proposed by Bhutto to end the war between India and Pakistan. The resolution, of course, came too late to stop India from seizing control of East Pakistan.

Eban congratulated Bhutto on the solid majority he had gotten for the ceasefire resolution. Replied Bhutto ruefully: "I would rather have the territory without the resolution than the resolution without the territory."

Bell-McClure Syndicate



Jack Anderson

Stans, Navy Join In Press Baiting

BAITING the press is becoming the Nixon administration's favorite indoor sport.

Throughout the government, the lesser lights are taking their cue from President Nixon who has unleashed Spiro the Terrible to pummel the press and has dispatched the FBI to investigate such individual offenders as TV newsman Dan Schorr.

Latest to take a bead on a reporter is big-game hunter Maurice Stans, the stouthearted Secretary of Commerce, who was mightily annoyed over an Associated Press story linking him to a U.S.-subsidized paper plant.

The AP charged that his Stans Foundation had acquired an interest in an obscure Thai paper company, which was benefiting from U.S. government handouts. Stans' side of the story was included, dutifully, in the AP account.

But the Secretary was not appeased. He tried to undermine the reporter who dug up the facts, H. L. Schwartz III, by writing a private letter to his boss.

The letter, in effect, invited AP general manager Wes Gallagher to reprimand Schwartz. Stans said he hoped "Mr. Schwartz will be properly reminded of his responsibilities to the facts." Stans called the AP man "irresponsible" and complained he was "without respect for the truth."

Columnist Silenced

IN ANOTHER case far from the national spotlight, the Navy brass have shut up a crusading columnist on the weekly Glynn Reporter in Brunswick, Ga. The paper is owned by an outspoken conservative, Bill Williams, who opens his pages to all opinions.

Once his little paper was fire-bombed by, he thinks, left wing radicals. But one of the paper's most popular features was a liberal column, called "Comment," which regularly tore into the establishment.

The columnist, who wrote under the pen name "Lucky Langston," called the Glynn Naval Air Station in Brunswick "a haven for passed-over Navy flotsam." Officers there, he suggested, "look like the crew of a ship stricken with scurvy."

His hot column set off some short fuses at the naval installation. Officers suddenly descended upon advertisers and demanded that they cancel their ads in Bill Williams' paper.

Since the small town's prosperity depends largely upon the Navy, the angry officers swung a big stick. Several merchants quickly killed or reduced their advertising in the paper. Others stuck with the embattled publisher-editor, and one appalled advertiser doubled his space.

But the loss was more than the paper could afford. In an emotional meeting, Bill Williams and Lucky Langston

agreed that the paper had to be saved. On Dec. 2, Lucky wrote:

"Lucky Langston dies in this edition . . . His premature journalistic death was caused by censorship, imposed after heavy economic intimidation of this newspaper."

Footnote: Glynn Naval Air Station's commanding officer, Capt. Carlos Stafford, conceded his officers were in the wrong and assured us he didn't "sanction" their retaliation against the little newspaper. He admitted, however, that he had neither investigated the incident nor disciplined the offenders. Nor, he added, did he plan to do so.

NATO Secrets

GEN. ANDREW GOODPASTER, the supreme allied commander in Europe, is privately squawking to his superiors that American NATO officers should not be required to testify before a House subcommittee investigating our NATO commitments.

The hearings, which will resume shortly, are being held in Brussels by a subcommittee headed by Rep. William Randall (D-Mo.) Several U.S. officers with NATO responsibilities have been asked to testify.

In a confidential cable delivered under seal to Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Thomas Moorer, Goodpaster passed on with his concurrence the text of a message from Adm. Horatio Rivero Jr., commander of the allied forces in Southern Europe.

"I strongly urge," wrote Rivero, "that U.S. officers attached to NATO commands not be required to testify formally before the subcommittee."

Rivero said, "I believe it would set a bad precedent to accept the premise that the legislature of one of the countries of the alliance can call up a NATO commander, whether or not of its own nationality, and question him or his staff . . ."

"I would, for instance, be most reluctant to appear before the defense committees of the Italian parliament, which include substantial Communist representation."

"If CINCSOUTH (the Allied Command in Southern Europe) were to appear formally before a U.S. congressional committee, it would be difficult to justify refusal to do so in the case of any nations furnishing forces or staff personnel for the Southern Region."

Goodpaster notes simply that, "I concur with these views."

Ben-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Uneasy Christmas in the Holy Land

By Jack Anderson

The secret intelligence reports—those dreary epistles of modern scripture—bear a grim Christmas message from the Holy Land.

They tell of war preparations along the Suez, of Soviet naval vessels moving into Egyptian ports, of a plot to kill Jordan's King Hussein, of assassins dressed in religious garb, of bickering among the Arabs.

The beaches along the Suez are empty, the crumbling, artillery-pitted villas deserted. Underfoot, the soil is tawny and acrid, its dust bitter on the tongue. To the Israeli and Egyptian patrols who eat the dust, it has the taste of death.

The Egyptians train daily, under Soviet supervision, for amphibious operations. Russia has supplied them with motorized rafts, portable bridges and minefield sweeping equipment. One intelligence report claims the Egyptians can lay nine bridges, each with a 60-ton carrying capacity, and two smaller ones, each with a 12-ton capacity, across the Suez.

On the east bank, Israeli troops wait for them in steel tunnels and underground bunkers buried beneath tons of sandbags. The bunkers are reinforced with rails from an abandoned Egyptian railroad.

From elsewhere in the Middle East, other intelligence reports add to the story. Three Egyptian officials, for instance, were spotted earlier this month inspecting Saudi-

Arabian airfields. An intelligence report explained that Egypt's President Sadat had arranged with Saudi Arabia's King Faisal "to relocate Egypt's civil air fleet in Saudi Arabia if hostilities were renewed."

Soviet Build-Up

Soviet cruisers, destroyers, submarines and amphibious craft, meanwhile, have been quietly assembling in the Egyptian ports and anchorages of Alexandria, Port Said, Kithira and the Gulf of Solum.

Declares a naval intelligence report: "The return of combatants and amphibious units to ports and anchorages in the Eastern Mediterranean re-establishes the Soviet naval presence, which was withdrawn in late October."

The Israeli assessment of "Egyptian capabilities and intentions" has been flashed to Washington by Walworth Barbour, the U.S. ambassador in Tel Aviv.

"Egyptian deployment along (Suez) canal," he cables, "gives Sadat option to open fire at any time with very little further preparation."

However, he added, Israel "has no intelligence that Egyptians intend resume firing within any specific time frame."

On this troubled Christmas eve, Bethlehem remains much as it did when Mary and Joseph first halted before the inn and, finding no room,

sought shelter in the stable. It is a huddle of flat-roofed stone houses, clinging to the bleak Judean hillside. Its narrow streets still echo to the clattering heels of heavily laden donkeys.

The stars seem to shine brighter over Bethlehem than anywhere on earth, and the memory of Jesus is fresh and breathing. But not far away, assassins disguised as Christian priests are reported to be preparing ambushes for Jordanian ministers and royalty.

"The plans include the adoption of Muslim or Christian priestly disguise to use when appropriate or necessary," states an intelligence report.

Mystery Man

The plotters are directed by a mystery man, known as Fakhri al-Amari, who operates out of a top-floor flat in Beirut. An intelligence report states that the downstairs entrance is guarded by at least four armed guards. No one is admitted until he has called Amari personally from downstairs, then at least one guard physically accompanies the visitor to Amari's flat.

Amari is described in the intelligence reports as chief of the "special services section" of the underground Fedayeen movement. He is responsible "for assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage and other acts of terrorism."

His top target is King Hussein, who smashed the Fedayeen in Jordan. Amari, accord-

ing to an intelligence report, is "still working on his plan to 'get' King Hussein of Jordan the next time the latter travels outside Jordan. Amari believes that the King's next trip will be to Paris."

As fronts, the assassins have used a travel agency, handicraft shop and small grocery store in Amman, the Jordan capital. They reportedly hope to obtain information on the King's travel plans from a pilot for the Royal Jordanian Airlines.

The defeated Fedayeen, meanwhile, are scattered throughout the Arab world. Many are nursing their bruises in Lebanon not far from the Biblical seaports of Tyre and Sidon.

Declares an intelligence report: "The unedifying spectacle of confusion, dissension and bitterness that pervades the Fedayeen leadership almost certainly has caused added malaise among the commando rank-and-file..."

"Reports have mentioned jealousy and disturbances developing between Fatah elements long stationed in South Lebanon and those recently arrived from Jordan and Syria, and we have reported gunfights between Saiqa commandos encamped in the central sector."

On that great parchment of mankind, the Holy Land where the Savior's sandaled feet once trod, there is this Christmas only precarious peace and little good will toward men.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Wednesday, Dec. 22, 1971 C21

HHH Declines to Rebut LBJ Memoirs**By Jack Anderson**

In a stern private memo to his staff, Sen. Hubert Humphrey, (D-Minn.) has turned down suggestions that he strike back at Lyndon Johnson, who, in his memoirs, sometimes made himself look good at the expense of his former vice president.

Humphrey was asked to write a review of LBJ's memoirs. Some staff members urged him to use this device to set the record straight and tell how his advice on Vietnam was ignored by Johnson.

Humphrey rattled off a quick reply, which was put into memo form intended for the eyes of his aides only.

"It has been suggested that such a review," he said, "would give me an opportunity to criticize the book, particularly on Vietnam, and in that fashion win some political friends. I'm not going to do it! I will have nothing to do with it!"

"Lyndon Johnson has been my friend for more than 20 years. We helped each other as senators, and we worked together when he was majority leader. He helped me become majority whip.

"Muriel and I have been close to him and Lady Bird. He selected me as his vice

president, and he helped me in my campaign for the presidency.

"There are always those who try to get me to publicize our differences on Vietnam. I can't see what good that will do the country. He read my memos and listened to my point of view. He had no obligation or responsibility to follow my judgment.

"He was the President, and surely those who know anything about our government must realize there can only be one official voice in the executive branch. It is the President's, not the vice president's.

"I will not now be party to any scheme to cut up Lyndon Johnson... I insist that everybody associated with me understand my point of view on the subject of Lyndon Johnson. This point of view is to be strictly adhered to regardless of political consequences."

Chinese Puzzle

Our cloak-and-dagger boys in Hong Kong have come up with additional evidence that Lin Piao, the missing Chinese defense minister and heir apparent, died in a plane crash after attempting to assassinate Mao Tse-tung.

The episode was triggered, reportedly, by Mao's move to

bring the army back under party control.

In the course of restoring order after the Red Guard rampages of the 1960s, military men had moved into key positions. But Mao sought to restrain them by citing one of his oracular sayings.

"The party commands the gun," he decreed. "The gun must never be allowed to command the party." The ailing Lin Piao, perhaps egged on by his military underlings, is said to have resisted.

Painstakingly, our Hong Kong hawkshaws have put together the pieces in the great Chinese puzzle. Here's the picture that has emerged:

Last August, Mao returned from a visit to South China by train. Lin Piao, knowing Mao's itinerary would take him through Shanghai and Wuhsi, arranged an assassination attempt in Shanghai. It failed.

Lin then planned to blow up a bridge in Wuhsi to wreck Mao's train. This, too, failed. Mao left his train at Wuhsi and hurried to Peking, arriving there on Sept. 12.

He ordered the immediate arrest of Gen. Huang Yung-sheng, the Army chief of staff; Gen. Wu Fa-shien, the Air Force commander; Gen. Li Tso-peng, the Navy political commissar; and General Chia

Hu-tso, the deputy chief of staff.

Mao gave them 10 days to confess.

Meanwhile, Lin had been preparing to flee to Russia on Sept. 13. He apparently got wind of the arrests and took off on Sept. 12 from Haipien airfield in a British-built Trident jet liner.

Mao gave orders, according to one report, for the Air Force not to pursue Lin's plane. It crashed, nevertheless, in the Wentuekhhan area of Mongolia.

On Sept. 24, the arrested military leaders were summarily removed from office, and special "case groups" were dispatched to the various regions to investigate and purge other disloyal officers.

As for old Mao, he came up with another proverb. "The enemy is nothing to fear," he recited sadly. "What hurt me most was the arrow fired by my ally and his smiling face after I was wounded."

Footnote: This account of Lin's disappearance comes from informants who are considered reliable. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Chinese are masters at planting tidbits of information in such a way that they can be pieced together to form a wholly erroneous picture.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Dec. 21, 1971 E15

U.S. Task Force Didn't Frighten India

By Jack Anderson

The dramatic appearance of a U.S. naval task force in the Bay of Bengal on the eve of the Pakistani surrender, it now appears, didn't intimidate India at all but merely strengthened her ties with Russia.

In New Delhi, Soviet Ambassador Nikolai M. Pegov gave India secret assurances that "a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and... will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene."

He also promised, in case of a Chinese attack across the Himalayas, that Russia "would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang." In short, he promised Soviet military action against both the U.S. and China if they intervened on Pakistan's side.

The fascinating story of big-power intrigue during the Indian-Pakistan fighting is told in secret diplomatic dispatches and intelligence reports.

It was precisely this sort of secret maneuvering that got the U.S. deeply embroiled in the Vietnam war before the American people realized what was going on. We believe it is in the public interest, therefore, to publish excerpts from the secret documents.

In earlier columns, we told how presidential adviser Henry Kissinger assured reporters the U.S. wasn't anti-India at the same time he was instructing government policy-

makers to take steps against India.

"The President does not want to be evenhanded," Kissinger emphasized at their secret strategy sessions. "The President believes India is the attacker."

Wrong Side

The State Department's professionals argued that, morally, the U.S. should be on the side of the Bengalis, who wanted their independence from Pakistan. The experts also warned that President Nixon's pro-Pakistan policy would only drive India into Soviet arms.

Kissinger gruffly disputed this, saying of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi: "The lady is cold blooded and tough and will not turn India into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique."

Heeding Kissinger and disregarding the professional advice, Mr. Nixon took a tough stand at the United Nations against India and ordered the Seventh Fleet to send a task force into Indian waters.

This was definitely intended as a "show of force," although the flotilla had the additional mission of evacuating stranded Americans from embattled Dacca if the need arose.

Plans were made, meanwhile, to arrange provocative leaks in such places as Jakarta, Manila and Singapore of the task force's approach. By the time the ships had assembled in the Malacca Strait,

both the Indians and Soviets were well aware they were on the way.

This merely served to bring India and Russia closer together. A secret intelligence report, giving a "reliable" account of Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Pegov's conversations with Indian officials, declared:

"Pegov stated that Pakistan is trying to draw both the United States and China into the present conflict. The Soviet Union, however, does not believe that either country will intervene.

"According to Pegov, the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effort by the U.S. to bully India, to discourage it from striking against West Pakistan and at the same time to boost the morale of the Pakistani forces.

"Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene.

Soviet Threat

"If China should decide to intervene," said Pegov, "the Soviet Union would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang. Pegov also commented that after Dacca is liberated and the Bangladesh government is installed, both the U.S. and China will be unable to act and will change their current attitude toward the crisis."

Another intelligence report, giving the secret details of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov's mission to

India, indicates there had been some Soviet impatience over the pace of the Indian blitzkrieg.

Kuznetsov, after his arrival in New Delhi on Dec. 12, told Indian officials that the Kremlin was "impatient with the Indian armed forces for their inability to liberate Bangladesh within the ten-day time frame mentioned before the outbreak of hostilities."

Kuznetsov pointed out, according to the secret report, that Soviet opposition to a cease-fire "becomes more untenable the longer the war goes on in the east.

"While Kuznetsov said the Soviet Union will continue to use its veto to stall any efforts to bring about a cease-fire for the present, he stressed the importance of quick and decisive Indian action in liberating Bangladesh in the shortest time possible.

"Kuznetsov delayed his scheduled return to Moscow because he is awaiting special instructions from Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, regarding India's request that the Soviet Union sign a defense agreement with the Bangladesh government after Soviet recognition of Bangladesh.

"According to Kuznetsov, Brezhnev was not in Moscow when Kuznetsov sent him the request for guidance."

The American people, meanwhile, are entitled to straight talk from their leaders.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Dec. 20, 1971 B11

Hussein: 'Help or I'll Go on a Ghazou'

By Jack Anderson

Jordan's King Hussein, in a secret letter to President Nixon, has threatened to go on a "ghazou"—a Bedouin raid against neighbors—unless the U.S. bails him out of a financial hole.

The plucky Hashemite king, sick with grief over the recent assassination of his loyal Prime Minister, angry over intelligence reports that the Palestinians plan also to murder members of the royal family and plagued with problems of state, has turned to Mr. Nixon for solace.

Hussein's letter to the President was delivered by diplomatic pouch.

"Dear Mr. President," wrote Hussein, "May I reiterate my gratitude for your message of sympathy and condolence on the tragic loss of my closest friend, the Prime Minister of Jordan, Wasfi Tell, who paid a very expensive price for his devoted service, integrity, courage and dedication to the preservation of Jordanian national unity..."

But the king sought more than sympathy from Mr. Nixon.

"There has never been a

time when Jordan needed financial aid as it does today," he added. "The minimum aid necessary to cover the deficit in this (fiscal year) 1971 and in the first half of (fiscal year) 1972 is U.S. \$20 million and U.S. \$40 million, respectively. We have now exhausted every resource of our own for meeting these deficits..."

"Only external aid can provide Jordan with the nerve and strength to continue to defend its principles and ideals, and to continue its pursuit of a just and lasting peace."

"Otherwise, we might have to go on a ghazou, an old Arab tribal custom, and get it, Sir, from some quarter or other in this neighborhood, possibly causing you a problem which may be even more serious than the one I am now posing, or otherwise, as the case may be."

"Truly, Mr. President, I do not know what else we could do... The importance of this aid to Jordan's viability, stability and continuity all compelled me to request your personal consideration in intervention in this issue."

Grand Old Polluters

A federal study of ghetto

pollution, intended partly to get black votes for President Nixon, has backfired against some of the GOP's Grand Old Polluters in industry.

The study recommends a federal crackdown on such Republican, campaign loyalists as the oil tycoons, automakers and chemical producers. Even the official who authorized the study, Environmental Protection Administrator William Ruckelshaus, is taken to task for failing to relieve city pollution.

The idea of studying the effects of pollution on the poor was dreamed up in the office of Morris Sydnor, a tough-minded black who works for Ruckelshaus.

In a briefing paper intended for Ruckelshaus' eyes only, Sydnor contended that Republican blacks "want results that they can point to when they go back to their communities."

The Nixon administration is doing nothing "significant" or "measurable," he wrote, against ghetto pollution. Therefore, "a promise of action and commitment to achieve results," he urged, "is a must."

With a bow in the direction of the 1972 campaign, he suggested Ruckelshaus should

promise some practical action by July 1, 1972—just in time for the political campaign.

Agreeing, Ruckelshaus presented the idea to black city leaders at a White House meeting on June 30. Seven days later, Sydnor was given the green light to go ahead with the study.

Clean Sweep

A thick report, entitled "Our Urban Environment and Our Most Endangered People," now has been completed. We have already published excerpts from a contraband copy, describing how solid waste, vermin-ridden water, pesticides, smog and noise have become the diseased "Five Horsemen" of the urban poor.

The unpublished report winds up with 40 recommendations. Most costly would be a \$50-million drive, called "Operation Clean Sweep," to clean up the ghettos. Three-men commando teams in 20 big cities would go through the ghettos gathering the trash that sanitation departments let stand in the streets.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, Dec. 17, 1971 D 19

Lon Nol at Center of Cambodia Crisis

By Jack Anderson

While world attention is riveted on the clash between India and Pakistan, secret diplomatic dispatches reveal that another grave crisis has developed in Southeast Asia.

A series of military reverses and the refusal of Cambodian premier Lon Nol to curtail his dictatorial powers has led several of his top lieutenants to the brink of resignation.

What's more, intelligence reports disclose that there is now considerable doubt about the premier's mental and physical condition.

One intelligence report quotes a high Cambodian government source as saying: "The recent military reverses appeared to have caused Lon Nol to take leave of his senses."

The same source is quoted as saying that on Dec. 1 and 2 "during a helicopter tour of the Kompong Thom combat area, Lon Nol suffered a syncope (in the French connotation, this includes heart failure) from which he 'recovered' only after two days of intensive care."

Whatever the truth about the premier's health, there can be no doubt that his recent behavior has seriously alienated a number of top government officers, including Prime Minister Sirik Matak and Chief of State Cheng Heng.

Intelligence sources have informed the U.S. Embassy in

Phnom Penh that these two officials and several others met with Lon Nol on Dec. 7 and urged him to "relinquish active direction of governmental and political affairs and become Cambodian chief of state." This would make him a mere figurehead.

"Lon Nol replied that he did not intend to be chief of state at this time, that he did not intend to be chief of state under the new constitution and that he would be Prime Minister and head of government under the new constitution as under the old," reports the intelligence dispatch.

The crisis led U.S. Ambassador Emory Swank to fire off a confidential cable to Washington, expressing hope a compromise might be reached but containing a pessimistic summary of the situation.

"At issue," the cable says, "are not only Lon Nol's highly personal and arbitrary methods of operation but very possibly the future of his government should Sirik Matak and others choose to resign."

"The dilemma which Sirik Matak and these contenders face, however, is that none of them would appear to be a politically viable substitute for Lon Nol, with all his faults."

Intelligence Items

Since intelligence reports can't always be verified, we use the Central Intelligence Agency's rating system. The source's reliability is rated al-

phabetically from A to F, and the content is given a numerical rating from 1 to 6:

Egyptian Preparations (A-2)—Israeli intelligence has corroborated reports that Egypt is making preparations to resume hostilities "in a few weeks." The Egyptians reportedly have in mind only "limited" military action. Israeli authorities have spread the word, however, that hostilities couldn't be kept limited.

Chinese Intervention (A-1)—The Chinese have been making weather checks along the Sino-Indian border since Dec. 8. This unusual interest in the weather has made the Indians highly nervous, causing them to issue anxious charges about Chinese "troop movements" in Tibet. Both the Indian and Soviet military attaches in Katmandu, Nepal, have asked the U.S. military attache whether he has picked up any reports of Chinese troops moving toward the border. But at this writing, no unusual movements have been spotted.

Boat Pollution

In its December issue, Sports Afield makes a stirring appeal to end the "flagrant ruin of our woods, water and air by men without foresight or conscience."

Elsewhere in the same issue, the magazine attacks us for writing that outboard motors, with the exception of the newest models, gush 100 million

gallons of gunk into our waters every year.

The defense of motorboat pollution was written by the boating editor, Zack Taylor, who neglected to mention that he has been wined, dined and junketed by the same motorboat makers he now defends. They have flown him to "conferences" from Arizona to Florida. Sometimes, they have handed him a first-class air ticket; other times, he has flown on chartered planes.

Putting up the money for his travel, meals and hotel expenses, not to mention free-flowing refreshments, has been such outboard makers as Mercury and Chrysler. He has responded by licking the fuel pump that feeds him.

Taylor rushed to the defense of the boating industry, incidentally, without bothering to check his facts. He accused us, for example, of taking our 100-million-gallon pollution figure from the maker of an anti-pollution device.

In fact, the figure came from a federal report, dated September, 1970, entitled "Contribution of Marine Outboard Engines to Water Pollution." The report declares for all to read:

"An estimate of the total amount of fuel discharged by outboard engines would be from 100 million to 200 million gallons." We selected the lower figure for our article.

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